A prec:iJe model of sodal InsUtutions ja dcscrlbed comprislng four dimeoslons: first, a macro-lcvel of groups, t)'pe8 of ac:tlons, end related notions, sccond, a miao-lcvel of undcrlylng Indivlduals and aclions, tagelher with suitable relations of intention, causal belief lIDd power. Power ls cbaraclcr~In a ncw way emcndlng proposals dis<:usaed recentIy. Third, the model conlAins Intellectual rcpresentatiOllS of items on thc rnac:ro-and miao-leveL Fourth, it contains a dimension including the origin and development of what we caU "sodal practlces" (smallest unIlS of socialty relevant behaviour) whk:h g!vea the model some b1slorlcaI deplb. By pulliDg 811 these items togetbcr, a powerfuJ modcl with a wide range of applications is a-cated. Tbc claim assoc:iated w1th tbis modells !bat it appHes 10 alllocial institutions whidl are slmi\ar to systems listed up In thc lntroduc:tion. Tbe way of applying thc modcl is discussed In detall on thc basis of an abstract examplc.
of one eommon basic theory-element is that tbe basic theory-element usually Is em. pirically trivial or nearly trivial wbile the whole net gets bighly non-trivial by means of the different special laws which hold only under very limited condltions and in very limited domains. 1bis net pieture bas proved eorrect for the most honoured theories in physics like mechanics, or thermodynamics. 1 A theory of social institutions necessarily has to be rather comprehensive. Therc is only a. narrow patb between its becoming unapprehendable beeause of tao many features being included whicb are thought relevant, and between becoming simple but trivial because tao many relevant features are left out. We believe that we are on that path, and though we may be nealer to the trivial side, our aeeount provides many opportunities for refinement or specialization wbieh will be indicated in seme plaees.
In a first step we restriet ourselves here to social institutions of first order, and to a static model. By a first order institution we mean an institution all of whose aetors are individuals. In eontrast, a bigher order institution has among its Betors at least one eorporate aetor. Tbe study cf bigher order institutions involves a marked increase in eomplexlty with respect to the present approach and eannat be addressed here. We think, however, that aur model will be useful for subsequent construetion of bigher order models. Our modells statie in the sense of not making fully explicit the process of the origin and development of an institution. It is clear that ultimately a satisfactory concept has to comprise these dynamical aspeets as weH. Tbc model is not entirely statie, however, it contains some Important dynamic Ingredients: 10-cal features of the origin and development of "parts" of an institution (ealled sacial practices in Sec. 3). Explicit reference to time can easily be introduced though we did not for reasens of simplicity, and because mere inc1usion of time does not by itself revea1 new insights. The items mentioned, origin and development of a whole institution, did play an important role in the construction of our theory, but cannot fuHy be worked out here. Also there is no apace for detailed comparison of our model with others. Tbe reader will recognize features similar from the funetionalist approach 2 in the form of hierarchies of power (Sec. 1), and from eonstruetivism3 in the nation and role cf superstructures in our model (Sec. 2). Tbe social practices in Sec. 3 are modelled Blong the Iines of the pieture of evolutionary theory4, and our account of power in Sec. 4 was inspired by recent work of WartenbergS• What is new is the way of putting these items together in a precise way, including a precise Becount of power, in particular. What will be missed is explicit reference to the game theoretlc IThe basic theory-elemenu o[ Ibo !WO theories mentioned can be shown to bc empirically trivial, sec Ba1zer, MouIines and Sneed (1987) , Cbap. rv. Our metbodologlcat approach is that of a recent &chaot known somelinles undcr lbe label or "atrucluraUsm". AcoordloS to Ibis approach, a slmplc Iheory essentlaUy Is slven by a class of models snd a clus of so called lnlcnded appllcatlons or inlended systema (i.c. sels of dala oblalned from real systems by vatlous sysICtnatlc mC8llll). Thc cmpirica1 claim formulalcd witb a Ibcory is that Ibo Inlcnded systems fit !nto sllitabte modela and in Ihls sense are explalned by Ibc tbcory (sec sec. V). MolC comprcbooslvc tbeorle& arc concelved 8111.18 or simple Ihcorles. lnlcrrclalcd by varlous links. Sec Balzcr, Moullnes and Sneed (1987) rar rurtbcr dOlalls.
2Sce Parlons (1951) . 3Por 11ll1lance Berser and Luclcmann (1966) . 4SCO Maynard Smllb (1982 )-5wartenbcrs (1988 . approach 6 . We understand our model as complementary to the latter. Our model is not committed to assumptions oe rationality and "independence" typical for the game theoretic account, and in this sense may be said to start from a more basic level. We do not want to deny that strategie thin1dng and behaviour is relevant and often important in institutions. Our individual POWER relation may be, and often should be, analyzed in game theoretic terms (this is why we used the term "complementary" above).7 Basically, our model focusses on arbitrary relations of power while game theory focuses on more rational kinds of strategie behaviour. 8 The following four basic features of a sodal institution are taken into account by our model First, the model eontains a macro structwe splitting up an institution ioto groups with cbaracteristic behaviour and different status. Second, it makes explicit the "underlying" miero level of individual behaviour, including intentions and relations of power. Third, it deals with the way in which separate kinds of actions typical for certain groups originate and develop. Fourth, it contains components ref1ecting the "images", "models" and "representations" which are built up in individuals and stabilize, end provide sense 10, their actions.
1. MACRO· AND MICRO STRUCTURE Tbe macro structure, or care, of an institution consiSt! of groups which are characterized in terms of tbeir behaviour and their "status". Behaviour is modelled in terms of action types, action types being understood as classes of actlons (tokens) wbieh are similar in certain respec1S. Tbc relations of similarity by which action tokens are grouped together to form a type will not be made explicit heTe. In a macro structure we Ulke the notion of action type as primitive. Bach group is chamcterized by means of a collection of action types typically performed in that group. We use a function X, cal1ed the characteristic function, which assigns such a collection of action types to each group. If ' Y is a group and {71, . .. ,'1' n } is a set of action types tben X('Y) '" {'1'1> ....7',,} means that each action type 7'i typically is performed by members of 1, and that all action types Tl, ... ,'1' n taken togetber are sufficient to distinguish members cf r from members of other groups. Members of other groups typica1ly do not perform actions of all the types '1'1> ....7'n. We cannot exclude, cf course, that members of different groups perform certain single actions of the same type. But members of different groups da not perform the same "combinations" or sets of actions if such sets or combinations are taken to be sufficiently large and comprehensive: members of different groups "behave differently". We do not require that the set of action types characteristic for a group determines that group 'Rcccnl lopies are supergamcs and evolullonary game tbcory. see llIy10r (1976) . Axelrod (1984) end SCholler (1981) .
71n such cascs, our defmltlon of power in D9 A17 becOIlIcs simUar to that used by ThI'baut an<! Kcllcy (1959) , in particu1ar their notion of fate contra\. In general, boweYer, wo malte no assumptions abaul ratioJl8/lIy and strategie thlnking so thai. in general, Ibe garne theoretic account oepower and our accounl a", dlfficull 10 comparc. sAnotbcr fonnalapproach 10 InatituUons ilI via productlon rulca, as Cound In the wort of R1raro, Skvorc/Z and Axten, ICO c.g. Ruaro and Skvorelz (1984) . In compar/loll 10 Out model Ibey provide a mucb mote flne graincd lICICOunl oE how aetions in an inatilUlionalizcd pattern CoDow, end are detCl'tllioed by, Oll&- of our theory. We speak of "status" beeause of certain similarities to this term's meaning in network analysis (which cannot be worlced out here, hawever.) The sta· tus relation is required to be transitive and antireflexive (A3 below), and such that there exists a group with highest "status" within the institution modelIed (A4).
A core C of a social institution therefore is a strueture
where r is a set of "groups" end a is a set of "action types", X is a "characteristie function" whicb maps eacb group inta a set of action types (those "characteristic" for members of the group), end~is a binary "status relation" among the groups. Moreover, the followlng axioms are required to hold: Al The sets of groups end action types are non-empty and disjoint. Tbc set of groups Is finite.
A2
Bach action type in a belongs to some set X("Y) characteristic for same group ofr.
M The status relation is transitive and anti-reflexive. A4 There exists one group with highest status.
In the following the status relation will get closely linked to the notion of power so that a group's higher status basically is derived from it's members having mote opportunities to exert power over members of a group with lower status. However, this link to power does not serve as a definition of status: the status relation in the final model still has its status as an undefined primitive. Axioms A3 end A4 bave empirical character. We can imagine possible counterexamples which bowever, if our models are correct, do not occur in real·life institutions. Think of an anarchist society like, say, tbe Nuer.' Whl1tever grouping we may imagine in such a soelety, we do not find a natural relation on the groups whicb satisfies the above axlom.s. This does not show that the axioms are "wrang". The point is that anarchie societies are not among the intended systems for a theory of institutions: they are "uninstitutionalized". It has to be stressed that the claim as· sociated with A3 and A4 is hold up only for instltutions of the kind mentioned in tbe lntroduction. We have nothing ta say about other kinds of sodal structures with stratifications that might be described wlth a binary relation among groups. Note that~needs not be conneeted. There may be groups the status of which is not comparable.
Groups, action types and X may be traced to the Tnicro-level of individuals and their actions (action tokens). Such connection provides meaning end partial operadonai access to the macro-concepts occurring in a core. We consider individuals, action-tokens (i.e. eoncrete, single actions in their historical uniqueness) and three relations among individuals end actions: relations of PERFORMANCE, INTENDlNO and exertlng POWER. Variables i,j will range over individuals, and a,b,c over 'See F1ap (1985) i PERFORMS a we use INTBND with three arguments, due to the special context in which it is applied when we come to define power relations (in D9, A17 below):10 i INTENDS that j should do b, or simply: INTBNDS (i,i,b) .
Tbe relation of power we use with four arguments: ll i by doing a exerts POWER over j so that j does b, for which we write: POWER (i,a,i,b) . This format allows for an easy defiDi.tion of exereising power. Wo say tbat i extIreises power over i iff there exist a,b such that POWER (i,a,i,b) . In the following, with respect to a given relation POWER(i,a,i,b), i will be called the superordinate agent and j the subordinate agent.
We define a micro base MB for an institution to consist of individuals and actions (= action tokens), together with the relations mentioned:
where J is a set of "individuals", A is a set of "acdons" (tokens), PERFORM, INTEND, and POWER are relations of the above format, and the following axioms are satisfied:
A5 J and A are non-empty and disjoined. The set J of individuals is finite. A6 Any two individuals i,i E J are involved in some POWER relation by means of suitable actions (te. there exist a,b E A such that POWER (i,a,j,b) or POWERU,a,i,b». There are no axioms about PERFORM and INTEN'D at this stage. In Sec. 4, these two relations will be needed in order to charaeterize the POWER relation, but the axioms to be formulated there involYe other notions in an unseparable way. So we abstain from formulating axioms here which would become redundant later on. A6 requires that al1 individuals are involved in the POWER relation. POWER therefore creates a connected network of ties between the individuals, a tie existing between two individuals whenever one of them exerts power over the other (with respect to suitable actions a,b). In applications the sets J and A must not be treated as merely observatIonal. Though there is no doubt that individuals and actions in most cases can be determined by observation, not al1 observed items will be relevant for the system under investigation, and the actions observed may vary with tbe observer.
Some choice and interpretation always will be involved. If we apply tbe theory to a groeer's shop, and observe a mother with child, shopping and wiping the child's nose at the same time we may well forget about the eMd and wiping its nose because these do not contribute to modelling the situation as an institution of the type "grocer's shop". Such problems of delimiting "tbe" correet sets of objects in a system with respect to a given theory occur in every field (including the natural seil00Jbe oJdlnaty Iynlax of INTBND is "i INTENDS 10 do~•• Our Ul8gc may easUy be lubsumed under tbIl by ta1dDa~BI an action wbicb contrlbutes 10 j'a doing a (from l'I point of Ylew). 11ThJJ 1.1 lllIIIetly tbe format used in Dahl (1957). ences), and the ultimate eriterion for a correct choice always is whether the process of applieation succeeds (compare Sec. 5).
A6 reminds of network analysis, and is put forward in that spirit. We believe that the possibilities of network analysis 12 are still far from being exbausted. One domain of application of network analysis that has been neglected up to now is that of networks of theoretica1, abstract relations, like our relation of POWER. The mere fact that power relations are not observable in the same way as are numbers of telephone ca11s, say, does not indicate that they are not operationally accessible. The least we can say is that they are open to direet verbal investigation. Moreover, in everyday life we have fine senses for determining power relations which might give further hints at operationalization. F"mally, a theoretical term of this kind needs not be fully operationalized, it may as weil be determined by means of our theory. We note that our INTEND relation referring to two individuals also yields ties which may be considered as creating a network. On our aceount, however, only those ties of INTEND are important which have same connection with the POWER relation. A full characterization of POWER will be glven only in Sec. 4.
Individuals and actions being available, groups of course can be treated as sets of individuals, and action types as sets of actions, respectively. Group membership and an action's being of a certain type then reduce to set theoretic membership. In this way we may base any "maero" core on some suitable miero base. Of course, such "foundation" requires further connections between the central notions on both levels. We have to state how the eharacteristic function and the status relation are related to the undedying individual notions PERFORM, INTEND and POWER. No definition of the former in terms of the latter is to be expected. Concerning the eharacteristic function we first state the obvious condition that every action type characteristic for a group also is PERFORMED by some member of that group. Second, and more importantly, we require that PERFORMANCE takes place in the frame given by the characteristic function (A8 below). Any individual i will perform only those actions b whieh are characteristic for one of the groups of which i is a member. Since the group is eharaeterl2:ed by a set of action types X(1) = {Tll ...,T,,} this can be expressed by saying that the action b belongs 10 one of the types '1'1, ...,7'" : bE 7'/0 for some i:5 n. Tbis axiom is a cluster law binding together three important concepts: groups (and group membership), PERFORMANCE and eharacteristic actions. Note that groups are not necessarily disjoined. If an individual belongs to different groups then it's performed actions have 10 be eharacteristic for at least one of these groups. Clearly, this requirement becomes stronger with decreasing number of groups 10 which an individual belongs. The most frequent case in applications is that of an individual's belonglng to just one group. It has to be emphasized that the groups eonsidered here are only those occurring in one institution.
Tbe conneetion between the status relation and the miero eoncepts informally may be stated as follows. A group 1 has higher status than group l' only if all members of 1 can exereise power over members of 1', If a "big part" of the lower group is thus affected, and if the converse of this relation does not hold, i.e. not all members of l' can exercise power over members of "'(, and a "big part" of 1 is thus 12See Burl (1980) roe 8 surwy.
left unbothered. This formulation may be emended as follows. First, we may re· place the modal aspect expressed in "can exercise" by the actual mode. 'Ibis yields an overidea1ized form, nowever. 'JYpieally, not a11 members of one group actually exercise power over members of tbe other-even if such events are alJowed to be spread over some reasonably long intervaJ. UsualJy, however, a "big part" of the higher group actua1ly exercises power. So a more realistic version is obtained by requiring "big parts" (and complementary "sma11 parts") in an places of the statement. We da not forma1ize the nation of "big parts", this might be done in different ways, for instance by referring to the actual numbers of members of the groups, and appropriate proportions. Also, we might use different proportions on both sides in order to obtain finer differentiation. 'IWo groups 11 and 12, for instance, may both have higher status than group 1 with equal proportions in 11 and in 12 of members exercising power over members of 1. If more members of 1 in this situation are affected by members of 11 than are affected by members of 12 we may say that 71 can be ranked "above" 12 relative to 7. We define a micro-based core for a saeial institution 10 be the result of founding a "macro" eore on same appropriate miero base. 'Ibus a mic.o-based eore MBC for an institution is a structure MBC'" (C,MB) where C .. A7 Bach group in r is a non-empty set of individuals (elements of J), and each individual in J belangs to same group in r. Each action type in e is a nonempty set of actions (elements of A), and each action in A belangs to same action type in e. Furthermare, for each action type characteristic for a group there exists an individual in that group PERFORMlNG an action of that type. A8 For any action b PERFORMED by same individual i there is same group of which i is a member such that action b belongs 10 one of the action types characteristie for that group. A9 For any two groups 1, Y :1 has higher status than l' only ü i) each member of a big part of graup 1 exercises power over same member of y, and a big part of l' is thus affected, ü) there are members of 7' which do not exercise power over members of 1, and onIy members of a small part of 1 are such that a member of l' exercises power over them.
Note that A9 expresses only a necessary condition for the status relation. This leaves us with the possibility of further constraining it in other ways. One possibility-open for future investigation--would be to use the mental superstruetures to be introduced below for further eharacterization: a group can have higher status than another one, for instance, if it ranks higher in most individuals' images of social structure and sOOal ranks. The "surplus" requirements in A7 excIude individuals and actions which do not occur in any group and action type of the structure, respectively. Such individuals and actions do not contribute to the theoretica1 picture, they are redundant with respeet to the institution under investigation, and thus are omitted. In an application it is always possible to choose individuals and actions in a minimal way to make these surplus requirements come out true.
Because of the centra} role ofaxiom AB and its counterpart A13 to be IDtroduced below lot U1 use some different terminology for the sets of actions characteristic {or a group. We say that an action type is admitted for a group (and for each member of that group) iff it occurs in the set of action types characteristic for that group, i.e. In the set of action types asslgned to that group by tbe characteristic function. In the same way, each action occurring in an action type admitted for a group or a member of a group also Is called admitted for tbat group or Its member. Axiom A8 then may be restated as requiring that actions are performed only if they are admitted for one of the groups to which their actor belongs. Thus the characteristic function, and with it the institution, provides a setting, er a space of possible actions, for each individual. It may be objected that AB can be immediately refuted by real-life counterexamples. In applying our theory to a firm we may be confronted, say, with an accountant performing a bank robbery which is not an action admitted for him in the firm under investigation. However, this and simüar examples cannot be used as counterexamples to Aß for the action referred to does not belong to any action type relevant for the firm, and thus should not be included in the analysis. lf an action is included in a model then there has to be a corresponding action type, tao (by A7). Yet the action type has to occur In a set cf action types characteristic {or a group (by Al), so an appropriate group also has to be included in the model. Thus the choice cf observed actlons as appropriate to occur in the model depends on the whole process of application. Eliminating further possible ambiguities, the previous definitions may be formally stated as followsP D1 C is a core for a social institution iff there exist r, El, X and~such that C= (r,e,X,~) and AQ-1 r, e, X and~are sets, X : r -. PO(El) and~~r x r, A7 r~PO(J), e~PO(A), ur -J, and ue -A, and for all 7 E r and rE e such that r E X('Y) there exist i E'Y and a Ersuch that (i PERFORMS a),
13We wrllC I : x ->" 10 express thal f 1&. Cunctlon Crom :c 10 ". By PO(x) wo dcnoto \hc power seI of:c and by zx" IM carteslan produet of Se1& % an<! ". Ux dcnoles the unton oI x (for a colleclion :c of sels): ux .. {uIVz E :c(u E zn. 9.1) for a big part,.,· of"'( an i E 'Y. exercise power over some i' E ,', and a big part of r fs thus affected; 9.2) at most for a small part ,0 of,', all i' e ,0 exercise power over some i e" and a big part of"'( is not affected by this. 
D3

SUPERSTRUCTURES
Part of tbe macro core of an institution: groups, action types, and the charaeteristic function, after a while get represented in tbe mental frames built up in the individuals, they get intemalized and often even explicitly represented by terms in the language spoken by these individuals. All struetures thus built up, wbetber conceptual or not, we subsume under tbe label of supemruetures. There is a simple condition for thefr development: tbe institution has to last for more than one (human) generation. This usuaIly being the case, parents from each group will pass on thefr implicit knowledge about rules of behaviour, that is, about the core of the institution, to their offspring. 14 But even those individuals which are involved in tbe emergence of an institution (which therefore is not present in thefr process of socialization) internalize the essential distinctions (groups) and terms of behaviour (action types and x}-though they may have no verbal expressions for them yet. Once fully built up, a superstructure covers various items: language, bellers, dispositions, and representations of the components occurring in a core: groups and action types (often expressible in the language) and the characteristic function and status relation (which sometimes may be so expressible but often are not). We restrict ourselves here to those items really necessary in the static part of the theory: language, causa] beliefs, and representations for r, e and X. Other items that might become important in specializations will be suppressed here. With respect to language substantfal restriction is necessary in order to malte applicable the technical means avallable today. We represent language by a space ofpropositions. Intuitively, aproposition is a class of sentences (of possibly different languages) wbich have the same meaning. Some phiJosophical objections notwithstanding!5 propositions are very praetical when applied with some awareness of the difficulties. Using the most economical approach we start with a binary relation~among propositions which may be interpreted as "implication in meaning". The proposition (represented by the sentence) "I am walking" in this sense implies "1 am moving" whicb is not a logical implication of course. Implication in both directions yields equality cf meaning, so in a sense~is already contained in the notion of aproposition. By a space of propositions we mean a set l' together with a relation~on l' such that (1',~) 14Th1s polnlls c1early e1abor81ed In !leeger and LudonaIll1 (1966 is a distributive, complementary lattice 16 with 0 and 1. In applications we may simply work with sentences as representatives of propositIons. and take the lattice operations ..,. A, V to correspond to the ordinary logical conneetives. Five additional items will be necded as QCcurring in any superstrueture. Fmt. we need a component representing a person's causal beliers. For each individual, we use a binary relation B among propositions; reference to the individual will be made explicit bolow. B(P.p') expresses that propositions p and p' represent events e.e' such that the individual under consideration bellefs e is a partial cause of e'. B(P,p') may be read metaphorically as "the individual believes that p partially causes p'''. Alternatively, we might work with a causal relation B* directly establlshed among events whieh would lead to a more natural reading of B*(e.e'): "the individual believes that event e partially causes e'''. We opt for causality being represented at the level of propositions because sodal theory puts more weight on causal belief than on "real" causes and effects, and because of strategie reasons not to be defended here. Partial causes are events which, together with other events (te. other partial causes) yield a "fulI" cause. Tbe problems of causality cannot be discussed hereP Tbe relation of causal bellef wlll play an essential role in our characterlzatlon of POWER in Sec. 4.
Second, we need representations of groups, action types. and tbe characteristic function. which are denoted by G (groups), T (action types), and CHI. respectively.
It would be most natural to assume G and T to consist of sets of terms in the language used by the individual, and CHI to be given by a set of propositions definlng which action types are characteristic for what groups. Such treatment iSt in fact, possible, but the technical compllcation implied is not balanced by direct benefit in this paper. So for the moment we prefer a coarser approach. treating G and T just as unstructured sets. and CHI as a function. mapping each element of G in a set of elements of T. In addition, we use a binary relation e among members of'P and T. Tbe interpretation is this. Elements of G are internalized representations of the different groups in the individual's superstructure, and elements of T are internal· ized representations of the different action types. CHI is same internalizatian cf the characteristic function in the individual to whieh the superstructure is assigned. CHI may be regarded as that individual's disposition to assoclate admitted types cf action with the different groups, and e as it's disposition to subsume some (representation of an) action under some (representation of an) action type. "CHI(g) = {tl....'t"}" may be read as "the individual intemally associates representations th ....t" of action types with tbe representation g of a group". and "p e t" as "tbe individual subsurnes proposition p, which represents some action, under it's representatlon t of an action type". If all representations are verbal, we may think of p as a sentence (describing same action), of t1o ....t" as expressions for action types. and of g as 8 term denoting some group. In general, however, we must not assurne that all these representations "are" verbal. or can be verbalized. 1b the present account verbaliza-161.0.~Is transitive, reflexive, and anti-symmetrie (x~y and y~x lmplles x .. y), Cor any two " b e l' tbeit infimum " 1\ b an<! aupremwn 11 v b wilb respeet to~exUt, and these Infima and suprcrna aallsfy th; usuallaws of distribution. Furthermore, therc cxists lhe Inflmwn (resp. supremwn) of al1 11 e 'P, clenoted by 0 (resp. 1), end Cor each 11 E 'P thete la Cllaclly one bin 'P (dclIOled by -'11) auch thatlll\b .. 0 and 11 vb .. 1. Sec Graetzer (1971) far balle !lOtions.
17A comprchcnslve, llOII·tcebnlcal account oe causallty ls foune! In Mackie (1974) . for a tcc:hnlc:al probebiliatlc approach aec Suppea (1970) . ' tion is inessential, in particular in conneetion with CHI. All we need is that CHI be intemalized so that It may guide the individual's behaviour. CHI also may be regarded as a rudimentary (representative of a) norm. In a more elaborate version of our models norms would have a natural place in the superstructures, together with some constraint requiring identical norms in members of the same group. This is another point where the present model may serve as a basis for further specialization. We do not state special axioms for the relation of causal belief. Some general axioms might be found by studying philosophicalliterature 17 while more interesting axioms will not hold in general but will be restricted to particular forms of social systems. Not only will particular causal beliefs in a society being thoroughly oriented towards magic like the Azande 18 , for example, be different from ours in the age of science, but the structure of the whole belief system is likely to be different. Therefore it seems better to Ieave axioms for causa! belief to be studied in specializations of the present theory.
We define a superstructure to be a strueture x the form
such that ('P,:S) is a space of propositions, B is a binary relation among elements of 'P denoting an individual 19 i's relation of causa! beliet; G and T are sets of internal representations of groups and action types in i, respectively, CHI : 0-+ POeT) is a function mapping representations of groups on sets of representations of action types which denotes the characteristic function as intemalized by i, end f is a relation of subsumption between elements of l' and T. The only axiom required to hold Is that ('P,::::S) be a distributive, complementary lattice with 0 and l.
In principle each individual i may have its own superstrueture. We use a funetion x to assign that superstructure to each individual i in en institution. Thus xCi) denotes the superstructure assigned to individual i, or simply: i's superstructure. In order to keep things legible we refer to the components of x(i) by an upper index "i". So20 ' P1,::::s1 etc. will denote Ul(x(i)), Uz(x(i)) ete. In addition to this assignment, in Sec. 4 we will need a more fine-grained representation function, repj, which (depending on eacb individual i) maps actions inta propositions, groups inta representatives in Gi, and the characteristic function X inta a function CHI 1 • Formally, repi may be defined on the union of the sets A of actions, r of groups, and the singletan {X} (see AO-S below), end be required to map each kind of argument into en appropriate va/ue, i.e. each action into some proposition representing Ws action, each group into some member of 0 1 representing this group, end the funetion X into the funetion CHi occurring in i's superstructure. We agree that repi(b) denotes the proposition (sentence) describing action b end rePI(r) the representation of group r in the lenguage. In Sec. 4 representations as given by the functions repi will be used to formulate the central lIlÖom for POWER relatiolU.
Starting from a micro-based core we add one superstrueture for each individual in the core, and we use functions x and rep to assign the whole superstructure and I'Sec Evans-Pritchard (1937), for CX8IIIple. 19Indlviduaills not made expUcllln Ibis definllion, but wlU be made explicil below.
: :F xU) . By A12 this possibility is ruled out for individuals belonging to the same group. In other words, superstruc· tures within one group are homogenous, and so are the ways different members represent actlons and groups in the language. In its present form this axiom aper· baps too strong and idealized. It implies, for instance, that in an institution in which alt groups are overlapping alt individuals have identical superstruetures. This ?rob· lem of the formallsm points to a real problem, however. There is same balance between the degree in which groups overlap on the one hand, and the degree to which the groups' languages are simitar or equal on the other hand. There are two ways to weaken this axiom. First, we slmply may blur it, and require that in each group the superstructures and the rep-functions are only approximatively equal The precise way of blurring here is not obvious and wnt depend on the concrete case. Another, theoretica1ly more interesting way consists in assigning superstructures not to Individuals but to pairs of individuals and groups. This allows to speak cf the superstructure of an Individual as far as It is member of some group, and therefore of one individual "having" several superstructures, each one being used in siturations governed by a correspondlng group. We do not pursue this posslbility her, but note that the final definitions in Sec. 4 can be easlly adjusted to such a treatment. A13 mirrors A8 on the level of superstructures. Roughly, It says that eac:h individual's PERFORMANCE has to be compatlble with the charaeterization of groups in the institution, but now with the characterizatlon as internalized by that same individual. This axiom Is important for the stabillty of institutions. One major rea· son far stability is that the individuals have internalized the institution's characterIstlc function, and because they behave in the frame given by that function in thelr individual interna) representations (A13). Using the notion of admissible actions we may restate A13 as saying that each individual PERFORMS only those actions which are admissible according to the individual's superstructure. Thus tbe superstructures restriet and guide the possibilities cf individual behaviour-in line with construetivism. Admittedly, Iittle is known by now about the nature of these internal representations of charaeteristic functions, and our CHI-functions are just a du=y to be filled by future research. However, even in this crude form the role of the CHI-functions In our theory as expressed in A13 is crucial. Here are the formal definitions of superstructures and social schemata. 
is such that for all iEJ: 
SOCIAL PRACTISES
Roughly, a new socially relevant type of actions originates and develops much like a new species. A new kind of action is performed with or witbout reasens, and if the surrounding is favourable, if other people around find it interesting, or important or exotic or chique, tbey will imitate it thus starting an avalanche of imitations. Tbe original action (or actions) plus tbese imitations then form a new action type in our technica! sense. A similar structure we find in the origin and development of groups of actors which perform a new type of action. At tbe beginning tbere are one or more "founders", people performing the new kind of action for the first time.
Other people imitate tbe actions and In this sense become "disciples" of the original persons. Again, under favourable conditions the process is iterated and alI persons obtained in the end make up a group with respect to a particular action type. Both these processes constitute genidentical entities, for they both spread from a respective source by means of a relation of imitation, and it is just this whicb provides their unity. In the case of groups it is obvious that different persona in a group may be quite different, they have notbing in common except their imitating the "inventors"of a new action type. But also for actions it will bc hard to hold up a thesis of their having common features besides their belng copfes of the original actions. It seems hard to identify, say, different forms of greeting one another only on the basis of the observed events in space-time. Tbe important elue for identification Is that they can be traced back to other, previous events which are imitated ("learned").
We define the auxiliary notion of a genidentical structure to consist of an abstract set D of "carriers", a subset SOURCE of D of "originals" or "founders", end a relation COPY among carriers. (6 COPIES 6') may be circumscribed as "6 is an imitation of 6'" In case of actions, and as"6 is a dlsciple of 6'" in case of indlviduals (children count as disciples).
D6 GS is a genidentical strueture iff there exist D,SOURCE and COPY such that GS = (D,SOURCE,COPy) and 1) D is a non-empty set, 2) SOURCE~D is not empty, 3) COPY~D x D is reflexive and anti-symmetrie, 4) cach 6 E D can be traced back through a chain ef COPIES to seme element ofSOURCE, 5) SOURCB contains much less elements than D D6-4 may be formallzed as requiring for each 6 E D the existence of some 61 E SOURCE and of 6", ...,6 n such that 6 n = 6 and each 61+1 COPIES 61 (i < n). D6· 5 has to be made precise in thc respective conten Different ratios and speeds of propagation are studled in the evolutionary branches of game theory.21 If time Is made explicit the number ID,I of carriers at a given instant t may be studled as a function of time (often an exponential one).
By combining the two genidentical structures associated with an action type and the group of agents performing actions of that type we obtain the fundamental con· copt of a social practise. It is fundamental because it is concemed with the smallest unit of socially relevant behaviour, a type of actions, and the way it originates and spreads. More complex social structures, so we claim, can be analyzed as systems of social practises (wlth further properties, of course). Social institutions provide one example for this claim (see D9 below).
A social practise consists cf a set T ef actions of the same type and a set '1 ef ac· tors such that each aetor at least once PERFORMS some action of that type. Both these sets have developed out cf corresponding SOURCES, the set of actions out of a set SOURCE(r) containing historically original actions, and the set of actors out of a set SOURCE('1) consisting of the actors originally performing the actions in SOURCE(1'). SOURCE.(1) may be called the set of founders or creators of the practlse. It usually is very smalI, often a singleton. Tbe actors may be aootract, corporate actors. Tbis is why we avoid the term "indlviduals" here. The set of actions aa weIl as that of actors consist of all COPIES which have been successively ob-
tained from originals snd founders. We need two different COPY-relations, one for each set. (6 COPY(-y)6 ' ) applies whenever a new aetor 6 definltely takes over the new behaviour and in thls sense becomes a new member of 7, and (6 COPY(T)6') applles whenever aetion 6 is a copy, an imitation of action 6 ' , 'I\Yo axioms may be formulated connecting the two basic sets 7 and T. First, they are restricted to contaln only elements which are involved in some PERFORMANCE relation (D7-4 below). Actions not PERFORMED by any member of the group can be excluded, even if they are simiIar to these occurring in T. In the same way we exclude individual. w.hicb do not PERFORM any of tbe actions in 7. Such individuals are not soclally relevant in constituting a sacia1 praetise-though they may be quite relevant in other respects (for instance in providing the physical means of life for the whole group). A second axiom (D7-5) conneets the original actions with the founders of the group. Bach original action, i.e. each element of SOURCE(T), has to be PER-FORMED by sOme "founder", i.e. some member of SOURCE (7), and conversely, each founder has to PERFORM at least one original action of the type under consideration. We note tbat the long historica1 development of social praetises resuJts in the individual superstruetures' being firmly and deeply implanted, which in turn gives heavy weight to the "frame of admissibility".
D7 P ia a social practise Iff there exist 7,T,PERFORM,SOURCE('y),COPY(i), SOURCE(T),COPY(T) such that SP ... (7,T,PERFORM,SOURCE(i),COPY(7),SOURCE(T),COPY(T)
) and 1) i and T are non-empty sets, and disjoint, 2) PERFORM~i x T, 3) (7,SOURCE(i),COPY(i)) and (T,SOURCE(r),COPY(r)} are genidentical struetuIOs, 4) for all a E T there is same i E "'I such that (i pERFQRMS a), and for all i E i there is some a E T such that (i PERFORMS A), 5) for all a E SOURCE(r) there is same i E SOURCE(i) such that (i PER-FORMS a), and for all i E SOURCE(1') there is some a E SOURCE(r)
such that (i PERFORMS a).
FUrther axioms conceming the COPY relations may be formulated, but are not needed bere. Tbe concept of a social praetise bas numerous applications, like "conferring a doetor's degree", "taking the boly communion" (Roman Catholic, say), "buming a witeh", "sieging a town", "performing a campaign (in war)", "electing a leader" (aay, the US president).
It is clear that the components of a social practise may be difficult if not impossible to determine. Tbe SOURCES often are lost in history, and tbe COPY relations also may be difficult to trace bistorically. Tbis may create the impression that the nation ia empty and irrelevant to social institutions. Th this posSlble objection there are two replies. First, as aJready mentioned, there are no natural standards of simüarity for actors and actions. h long as aetors and actions are not formally defined in an institution, thc basic approach towards their similarity, and tbus towards the notions of groups and of action types themselves, is via genidentica1 struetures. Second, and more importantly, genidentical struetures form a conceptual basis on which varioos different forms of growth and of growth conditions may be formulated and studied. By g1ving further, special inner structure to the actors and aetion types, by introducing the notion of special external conditions together with speciallaws goveming the COPY relations we may obtain quite substantial structures. However, just as in the theory of evolution, such speciallzation Is possible oniy at the cost of conslderably narrowing down the range of appUcations. As stressed in the introduction, our aim here Is only 10 present the genelll1 modeL
In order to incorporate social practises into social institutions, two adjustments have 10 be made. First, actors have 10 be Interpreted as individuals for we deal here with first-order institutions oo1y. Second, we must not always identify a "group" of a social practise with a group in an Institution. There are important social praetises the actors of which are distnbuted over different groups of an institution. Think of the hOly communion, say, in feudal Francel Moreover, a social practise may be much older than an Institution of whieh it becotrtes an Ingredient. In this esse the "group" of the sOOal practise will contain many nilore individuals than each corresponding group of the institution into which the practise has found entrance.
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
We now have prepared the ground for iJ:ltroduclng a comprehensive definition of social institutions. We start from a social schema, which is enriehed In two steps.
In the first step, we assume that each admittcd pair (i, r) conslsting cf a group ' Y and an action type r In the schema's :ccre ls "given" by, or embedded or anchored in, a social praetise. Recall that a,core was defined to consist essentially of a set of groups each of which is eharacterized in terms of the action types performOO by it's members. An admitted pa,r conslsts of one such group and one of the action types characteristic for that SIioup. Our assumption of embOOding thus amounts to regardlng each such action t)'pe as having originated from some his10rieaUy first events of aetions of that type performed by individuals perhaps lang ago through sequences of imitations in w~ich the number of individuals acting also increases. Usually, the group and action 'type making up one admitted pair in an institution will not correspond 10 a fuH sqeial practise. In a typical case, a group in an institution origlnally is formed by ind~duals which already are usOO to one or several social practises exlsting before tlje institution is formed, but there will be other Individuals usOO to these social practises which do not become members of the group in question. orten, one socialpractise in this way contributes to admittOO pairs in different groops of one or sereral institutions. For this reason we must not identify an admitted pair {'Y,T} witll. the full "base sets" of a corresponding social practise. We say that an admitted pair (1,T) is anchored in a sodal praetise if 1 and T are subsets of the eorresponding sets of aetars and actions in that practise. This relation is best seen from; the poInt of view of a given soeia1 practisc P = h",T",PERFORM",SOURCE('y"),COPY(1"),SOURCE(r"),COPY(r")}.
In the formation of a new institution it may happen that some of the individuals involved are practitioners of the soda! ljlraetice, i.e. members of 'Y". Moreover, it rnay happen that the action type of the .,cial practise is relevant for the institution.
In that case it is Iike!y that the set of members of 'Y" which oceur in the system will form one of the evolving institution's groups, and the set of actions in T* performed by these members will form one of the institution's action types. 3) PERFORM and PERFORM* are identical when restricted to 1 x T.
Note that the analogon to 08-1 fails to hold for groups. Individuals from düfer-ent groups may weIl engage in a common social practise. In faet, Ü there are DO common practises at aII, an institution win not last for long.
For a soclal institution we require that all the institution's admitted pairs be anchorecl in thc seme of 08 in suitable soda! practiscs. We use a function y to assign these social practises to the admittecl pairs, so y«"{.T"}) denotes tbe sodal praetise in which thc admitted pair ("{.T) is anchored.
The second feature by which socia! schemata are enriched in order to obtain institutions consists in a detaiIed characterization of the POWER relation. Consider Our cbaracterizatioD has the form of an cxplicit definition but is not intended to serve as a mere definition. Rather, we regard it as an ordinary axiom of the theory which happens to have the form of a biconditional. Such axioms frequently occur in respccted cmpirical theories; think of Newton's second law. Not regarding (AP) as a definition Jmplies two things. First, the axiom is open 10 variation in the "definlng" conditioDs. We may add further requirements 10 a}-d) in order to obtain more special charaetorizations which do not hold in all cases of exertion of power OOt onIy in certain subsets of cases. This shows that (AP) may serve as a core for a llttle self-contained theory of power in small groups which can be specialized in several ways to deal with different important forms of power like force, coereion, and manipulation. 22 Second, the notion of POWER is not fuIIy redueed to the other eoncepts occurring in condltions a)-<1). Rather, it is taken as an ordinary primitive referring to some feature of reality, and accessible by means independent of the above axiom. Aß the concepts occurrlng in b) and e) are of the same diffieult eate· gory as POWER ltself with respeet to operationallzation nothing would be gained by insisting that the axiom ckfines POWER. On the contrary, there are direct-though not very reliable--means to determine POWER, for instance by appropriate scales.
Our characterlzation of POWER intuitively may be spUt up into !WO parU, one part (conditions a-c) concerning the micro level of aetions, performance, intentions, and causal beliefs, the other part (condition d) exploiting the frame given by a social schema (cbaraeteristlc funetion, superstruetures). Tbe first part of b) is necessary in order to exclude actions with unintended causa! consequences (like a car accident) from the tange of exertions of POWER, tbe seeond part of b) eaptures the in· sight that POWERexists only where there is some form of resistance.23 Tbe third "miero" conditlon c) deals with the causal connections between the two agents' actions. Here the easy account would be to refer to an "objective" causa! relation and to hold that j's action b is causally determined, at least partially, by j's action a.
However, causa! bellefs may differ between individuals from different soclal groups (think of magic bellefs, or belief in witebes). We do not want to decide here whose causal relation is "tbe correct" one. In socia! reality there are frequent cases in which power is exerted on the basis of bellefs on the side of the subordinate agent which the superordinate agent regards as wrang or superstitious. This ls part of the reason wh)' we chose causal bellefs rather than an "objective" eausal relation to fiSure in superstructures. Now we are in tbc position to use causa! beliefs efficiently. In c) we require the individuals to believe that ps action b is partiali)' caused by i's action a. It is not necessary that both individuals have such belief. Varying with thc particular form of power it may suffice that either the superordinate agent or the subordinate agent has it 24 • Of course, very often, both of them will have it. An im· p0rtant example of a form of power in which tbe causal eonnection may be hidden to one of the agents, is manipulation.
The second part of conditions for tbe POWER relation in (AP) relers to tbc frame given by the institution, or rather the social schema, in which the events take place. Aß stressed twice already', the charaeteristic function occurring in the eore as well as its representations CHr in the superstructures provide a frame of admltted actions. All actions PERFORMED by an individual in a sodal schema bave to be admitted, on thc object level (A8) as well as on the level of superstruetures (A13 of "power in a sOOalinstitution", rather than of power in general. However, since
POWER(i,a,j,b), by a), implies that (i PERFORMS a) and U PERFORMS b),
Ag and A13 automatically imply that actions a and b are admitted on botb levels in any exertion of POWER. So admissability needs not be explicitly stated as a conditlon for POWER. In other waMs: in a social schema (AP) above 1s equiva1ent to a characterization in which d) is omitted. Uslng A8 and A13 we prove witbout difflcu1ty: in the superstructures (as opposed 10 the level fo material reality) does not perfectJy agree with causal talk in ordinary language whlch always procecds in the realistic mode. But as stated above it is causa! belief rather than real causes and effects that matter in social theory, and a causa! relation among the propositions which are at an individual's disposal is well suited to express such beliefs.
It has to be stressed that condition Al7 above covers only the mode of actually exerting power, not that of having power. The latter may be introduced by means of conterfactuals. Individual i has power by doing a to induce j to do b iff: if i would PERFORM athen i by doing a would exert POWER over i to da b. There are standard ways to analyze such counterfaetuals in possible world semantics 2S • In the present case such analysis would require to introduce sets of socfal institutions "similar" to a given one.
If in condition Al7 we look at part c) being satisfied for Individual i and at the first half of part b), we see that POWER(i,a,j,b) implies that i INTENDS 10 acbieve a goal (nameJy that J should do b), and i believes that bis doinS a causally contributes to reaching this goaI. This Is just thc standard definition of goal directed action. So in most cases rs exerting power in the sense of Al7 Is a goal-directed action. We may use this observation 10 locate the speclfic features in wbich exerting power goes beyond mere goal directed action. First, the goal has a special format: it consists in another individual's action. Second, some resistance Is present on the slde of the subordinate agent j: in }'S not INTENDING to do b. 'Ibis resistance to be overcome is an essential feature cf power as a1ready mentioned. Dropping it would bring wem Al7 very near to special forms of mere goal directed action.
Finally, it has to be noted that our formulation of A17·b is very weak, and mlght be replaced by the stronger version saylng that j INTENDS not to do b. If b just not INTENDS 10 do b she may bave no intention at a1l conceming b, in particular no intention not 10 do b. Out weak version stretches the extension of POWER 10 those cases where there is no real resistance 10 be overceme, just undecidedness. Accord· ingly, the notion of a social institution becomes much broader, including POWER relations of a type of "mere stimulation". Tbis alIows to cover the examples of a more economic nature mentioned in the introduction. Also, our weak version of A17-b alIows 10 subsume those cases 26 under the theory in which the superordinate agent keeps silent about certain possibilities the subordinate agent might pursue ü he were aware of them ("non-issue" poIlcy).
There is a more difficult form of power which escapes our formalism. We think of cases in which the subordinate agent has intemalized bis subordinate role, and identifies his intentions with those of the superordinate agent in a way pointed out a1ready by Hege!. In such a case we would have "INTENDSU,j,b)" which contra-
in A17-b. We cannot slmply drop (*), bowever, we have to replace it by some weaker condition, for dropping (*) altogether would reduce POWER in A17 to mere goal directed causal influence. A natural solution here is to refer to }'S intentions by means of a counterfactual. We suggest to replace (*) by if j were ralsed under approxlmately the same conditions as i then j would not INTEND to do b (**)
in order to deal with tbe cases in question. Of course, the "conditions in which an individualls raised" escape our conceptual frame but they might by systematlzed in an extension of it.
:1lFor inslancc, Lewl. (1973) .
26Lukes (1974).
In order to make precise all the details of the mode~let us state the definition in a completely formal way. The theory of social institutions intrOduced in this way consists of the class of a1l posSl'ble sodal institutions (as defined in D9) plus the set of an real systems to which it is intended to apply. This set of intended systems was roughly described in the introduetion. The claim associated with the present theory is that each intended system is a sodal institution in a sense still to be specified. D9 SI 1s a socitzl institution iff there exist r,e,X,~ 
APPLICATION
Tbe process oe application to some real system of a theory as given by a dass of models in an areas of empirical science has the following form. First, data are collected and formatted in the theory's vocabularyZ1. Second, it is tried to fit these data with the theoretical hypotheses. Identifying hypotheses and models28 such fit essentially amounts to an existential c1a~. The data fit with the hypotheses if therc exists 80me (hypothetical) model into which the data can be consistently embedded, i.e. which contains "parts" corresponding to the data in a natural way. If the theory can be successfully applied to some intended system in this sense we may claim that the system investigated is asomal institution. Aceordingly, the claim associated with the present theory is that all the intended systems described in the introduction are social institutions in the sense just explained In ether wards, the data which can be collected from those systems a11 are embeddable in corresponding models. Due to the complexity of our models it is impOSSIble to provide a two or threepage example based on proper empirica1 investigation or data. Instead, let us con· sider an unspecific system which by appropriate historieal studies could give rise to a real application. Three Bims are pursued by these considerations. First, we specify what kind of historical data and methods are required to da a proper empirica1 study of an institution. Second, we want to show that all out models' components are present and capture important features of real institutions. Third, we want to examplify our general view of application sketched in the previous paragraph.
27NoIO thal wc dcscrlbc thc process of applyiog an alreadyexiatlns lheory, nol the process of inventIng 11. Tbo theory Is sIvelI beforchand. 28 1110 hypolbeaca doline Ibo models es thoso struetures In wbIch Ibcy are valid, aod conversely, any useluI dass of models Ja dc1incd by a set of h,ypothesea. "Sec BaJzer-Moullnea-Sneed (1987) for a detailed aceounl of thla Idee.
One feature cf this view which is partieularly relevant to the present theory is that it does not presuppose a distinetion between theoretical and observational terms which is often made in order to separate "reliable", "objective", observational date !rom "merely" hypothetical hypotheses. Such a distinction being very problematic even in the natural sciences30 we think there is no reason to insist in austere observational foundation which simply is not feasible. A theory T's data COllSist of si! a10mic sentences of T for which there are sufficiently reliable means e:f determination, sufficient reliability often being a matter of agreement in the respective sei· entific community. Tms view goes together with a very liberal conception of data: by a datum wo understand every atomic statement whlch can be obtained in a sys. tematlc way. Roughly, this means that it be obtained from other data or hypotheses in a unique way as guaranteed by some reguJarity.31 Thls notion does not insist in reproducability as it oceurs in measurement in the natural sclences (whleb cannat be achieved in sociology) but keeps eoough substance to malre data a non-trivial matter of intersubjeetive (and in this sense objective) agreement. In particular, we do not insist in methods of determining the "objec18" occurring in a system (like action 1okens. action types. individuals and groups) in a way completely neutral and independent of the language and intention of the investigator. In the social sciences it seems necessary and adequate 10 admit for a moderate amount of antecedent understanding to provide the investigator with a first rough goide for application.
We begin our example by looking at a realistic set of emplrical or hlstorical data. Consider a system with three groups as realized many times in medieval European villages: one group consisting of the local nobleman (a count. say) plus bis family. a second of the peasants and tbeir families, and a third of "intermediate" persons: priest. teacher. servants.
It seems relatlvely easy 10 determine the lndivlduals and actions occurring in the system as well as the PERFORMANCE relation. By direct inspection as a competent speaker of the language or by historical studles we may collect a set of descripdons of action tokens (printed in italics below) together with a list of statements of tbe form (iJ PERFORMS 0J), j = 1•... ,m about which person performs whicb action. Also, the determination of action types does not seem 10 pose any partieular problem for our theory. Things are different for the remaining macro cOIlcepts: groups, characterlstic funetion, and status relation. How can these be determined? lf we try 10 determine each cf these notions on i18 own. and independer.tIy of our theory, wo run into difflculties. Coneerning the groups an investigator with different intentions (biological or medical. say) would perhaps arrive at a very different grouping. Bven the soclologist who understands the system alang our lines has dü-ferent possibilities of grouping. corresponding to different levels of detail She may take a coarse grained group structure lumping together nobility and clergy, or the one indicated above, or proceed even mOre fine grained differentiating, say, between male, grown-up peasants, women, and children inside the larger "group" cf peasants. Concerning the cbaracteristic function it is not adequate to take an action types observed as being realized by members of a group to be characteristic for that group for in this way we would arrive at many types which simply ljIe irrelevant in 30Sec Balzer (1986) ror a tcecnt discusslon. 3tScc Balzer (1990) ror an elaboratlon or our vlcw or meaallremenL the institution under study or da not contn'bute to any differentiation of the groups. Statlstical consideratians and/or techniques from network analysis are required in order to acbieve a simultaneous determination of groups and tbe charaeteristic funetion. Wo do not want to look at a particu1ar metbod here, the important point is !hat such methods da not rely on tbe present theory. By contrast, it is difficult to Jmaglne any method to determine the status relation which would not use A9, and therefore would be independent of our theory. So in order 10 avoid circularities it seems Mse to avoid statements about~in tbe data.
In the system of a wlage we might obtain action types of the follewing kind: 'l"l,~,T3 E X (11) 1'4' TS, '1"6, ' 1"7 E x<7z) Ta,1'9 E X6'3). 'Ibe remaining two notions, INTEND and POWER, sre of a different kind. In contrast to the physics paradigm there is Da measuring apparatus for these notions funetioning independently oe the observer. There is no hope of achieving such apparatus in the near future but also there is no hope of replacing nations like the two considered here by other, "measurable" notions of similar theoretical force. On the other band it would be short-sighted simply to dismi&S nations cf that kind as useless for empiriCal theories. There are simple and effective means 10 determine intentions and exertions of power, namely those which every competent speaker of the language used in the system has acquired tagether with leaming the language. These means are c.ommunicable, invcstigators may disagree about the intentions as expressed by observed verbal and non-verbal behaviour, or corresponding historica1 data, and they may argue systematically about them (as done by bistorians and politica! scientists). We think that our abilities of ascribing intentions and power aequired through language competence may be used as a basis in order to determine notions like INTEND and POWER for the aim of applying our theory to empirical systems. We admit that these means are not the most reliable ones, but we hold that they are not unscientific apriori. Th exclude them dogmatically (te. by pointing to the big brether of physlcs) would mean considerable impoverishment of social science.
Frem observing verbal and other kinds of bebavior (or from corresponding bistorlca! faets) we might obtain a list cf statements about INTEND and POWER. The count intends to hunt, and intends that peasanC1 serves as a beater. PeasanU, on the other hand, intends to work on bis field in the same time. Tbe teacher intends peasant_2 to send bis daughter, cbild..:3, say, to the Sunday school. PeasanU intends his daughter to help him working in the fjelds etc.:
It ls much more difficult to get data, or to aglee on data, about the superstructures wbich are likely to differ for members of different groups. If we think of a system in wbich nobility is in close contacl with the court then very likely its lan· guage will be refined and contain many terms unknown or at least not used by the peasants. By blurring some idiosyncrasles present in each individual's language linguistic studies might yield spaces of propositions ('pl,~i) for each individual i occurring in the vl11age. Also, causal beliefs are Iikely to differ for members of the different groups. Tbe peasants may believe, say, that an old woman Jiving in the forest is a witch and may cause certain unusual things to happen wbile members of groups "11 and /7. do not have such causa! beUefs. Also the priest may hold some causa! beliefs involving bis God which are not shared by tbe very mundane count. Tbough all these causal bellefs are hypothetlca! from the soclologist's standpoint there are methods of different degrees of reliabllity In order to Infer tbem: verbal interrogation and observation of behavlour (er corresponding inferences on the basis of historical sourees). It seems sound to assume that at least some of the causal bellefs Bk(repk(al),repk(bJ» (for appropriate i,j,k) can be obtained in this way. Tbe last feature to be considered are the social practises from which the relevant action types stem. These practises are difficult to trace. How and where did patterns of feudal bebaviour typical for tbe noble persons in tbe system originate? They must have originated at some time, the medieva1 patterns did not exist in antiquity. We bave to go back to the early middle ages when the first cavalry armies were formed, and the European type of tbe knight made its first appearance. We have to look at the formation of tbe catbolic church in order to find tbe practises relevant for the priest ancl, later on in 11th and 12th century, for the teacher. Tbe church also yields same practises for tbe other groups, Iike the holy communion, or the ways of deaIing with birtb, marriage, and death. Even at the side of the peasants we may find sociaI practises, for instance in connection with ways of farming, of growing cattle, of dealing witb siclcness, or just of cooking. All these action types once bad been "invented" and were delivered from tben generation after generation. It is clear that a ful1 statement of aD tbe knowledge available about the different social praetises involved here would blow up the set of data without end. By spending enough energy it certainly is possible to provide substantial collections of relevant data about the actions, actors, and the respective SOURCE and COPY relations connected with tbe action types considered above. Realisticaßy, however, application of the present theory will not go into much detail concerning tbe social practises.
Having shown what kind of data are needed Cor the present theory, and how they can be obtainecl, let us now consider the question whether all our primitives are reaDy important. No argument seems necessary here for the notions of action, action type, individual, characteristic function, tbe status relation, and PERFORM and POWER. First doubts might occur witb respect to INTEND. Intentions are an essential ingredient in our characterizatfon of power (as weil as in human beings generally) because without intentions and the corresponding requirement A17-b we would be left witb mere causal influence instead of power. 'Ibis, in turn, would devaluate the use of POWER in determining the status relation via M, and leave the status relation witbout link to the miero baso. So INTEND, in fact, is important to our theory.
A second doubt might arise for the superstruetures. Omitting them would yield an "observationally equivatent" surface of behavior and core structuro. So what is their use in the theory? There are various replies. First, superstruetures are the pOints of eristallization for institutionalized behaviar. Patterns of behavlor can be formed only together wlth internat representatlons. Second, superstruetures are tbe carriers of education and ideology. Institutions typically get "fully expressed" only a gener· ation or more after their first appearance. Tms is so because for later generations institutions are a "natural" part of the system. They get firrnly impressed in the superstructures of the individuals by the process of education. As a consequence of this, thirdly, superstructures are cruclal for the explanation of an institution's sta· bility. Without recourse to superstructures we simply could not understand wby In many cases tbe "lower" groups bear an institution for 10ng periods. Though we da not focus on the explanation of stabillty in the present paper it is clear that our theory is able 10 provide such explanation, and that such explanation cannot be given without the superstruetures.
The final items to be chec:ked for importance are those occurring in the sodal praetises. It might be objeeted that these are not only superfluous but even hindering because they introduce an element which practically escapes empirlcal investigation. Tbere are two reasons why we think that none the less social practises are essential in a theory of social institutions. First, (in the absence of legal or formal definitions) they provide the major means for an identification of soeisl groups, and olten also of action types. In the example, the group of nobility even forma11y is identified by genidentity. Second, as already mentioned in Sec. 3, social practises provide a general basis for specializations in whlch condltions of an institution's fit 10 its surroundlng may be studied. The dynamical part of an explanation of why a particular institution did develop and spread in a particular setting ultimately has to refer to things h1ce our COPY relations: why do individuals take up and stick to certain kinds of behavior while they do not take up other kinds. Very roughly, we cannot ignore the immense hlstorical depth of many of our most important social praetises if we want to understand our most complex and important institutions.
Thrning now to an exemplification of our general view of the process of application we have to ask whether a set of data as described above can be fitted with a model? We have to go through tbe various axioms, and see whether the data satisfy them or can be shown to be embeddable Into a strueture satisfying them. Since the status relation Is not represented in tbe data an existential claim bas to be made: there exists a hypothetical status relation which satisfies axioms A3, A4 and A9. On the basis of the data in the example such a relation indeed exists. We may defme it by setting 13"12"11 and 73....,1> no other pairs of groups being related by ... Clearly, ... is transitive, anti-reflexive, and has a maximal element as required in A3 and A4. Moreover, the full list of POWER relations available will verifY-<lr at least be compatible with-A9. Most noble individuals exert power OYer clergy and peasants, most individuals in 12 exert power over peasants, OOt neither of these quantitative relations holds in the other direetion. A2 and A7 can be satisfied conventionally, A6 stating tbat a11 indlvlduals are lnvolved in POWER relations is satisfied in the data, and the same holds for the axiom AB of admissibility.32 32Illa not eaay to "" bow tbo coI1ectlon oI data hallO proeeed 10 tbat AB wUl corno out falle. Baslcally, tbc dara aboul lhCl dlaraderlstlc funetion will bcl obtalnecl by obl"",llll many performancea of different actlons, and use lbeIe es a 1>asis for abltradlos groupl and dlaracterislic aalon l)pCl. Therel'OlCl a performed action haa 10 bCl to an outlycr In the Itatistlcal sense In order to conrDet with lhCl requlrClmcot of bcJnS admlulble.
A BASIC MODBL FOR SOClAL INSnruTIONS
AItogether the axioms for maero eore and miero base come out true. The axiom for proposition spaces (AlO, D4-1) is rather idea1lzed, and subjcct to doubt, but not very essential for thc overall claim that the system is a secial institution. Thc other parts of superstructures are represented in the data only very partially. So they have to be completed in a hypothetical way. 1t is not difficult to find a set of hypothetical superstnletures which satisfies AlO and All.
Similarly, the axioms for social practises have to be satisfied essentially in a hypothetical way, by rcferring to hypothetical entlties extending the few available data to the full struetures required. There rcmain tbe two central axioms cf 09. The content of the first axiom, A16, ia that to every admitted pair there exists ("we can find") a "corresponding" social practise In which the pair is anchored. Consider for example the group of noble individuals and tbc action type of hunting33. Clearly, hunting is a lOcial practise even though it is impossible to specify the complete sets cf individuals, actions, and the SOURCE and COPY relation. Therc must be historicalJy first events of hunting and there is a tradition in which the techniques are inherited. It seems realistic to consider one of several different social praetises here which may have been invented independently of each other in different periods and different regions. Anyway, by comblning sparse historical data with the givcn admitted pair, it scems possible to claim that there exists same social practise inte wbich these data can be embedded. The same holds for the other admilted pairs-with varying degree of plausibility. The axiom for the POWER relation, A17, finally seeIDS to be satisfied as far as tbe available data are concemed. We see no problem in adding hypothetical entities at places where data arc lacking (as for instanee data about repk(a) in A17-c so that the axiom comes out true. Altogether, we think the claim that the system considered is a socia! institution can be seen to be correct.
In our example we have social praetises eommOn to a1l the groups involved, for instance the haly communion (as long as the village is small enough and nobility does not cclebrate separately). One might suggest that such practises are irrelevant for they do not serve fer auy differentiation. They play an important role, however, in the internalization of tbe different types of actions and the characteristic !unetions and thus may be quite essential for the institution in question. Our example also shows tbat POWER relations may exist "from bottom to top". Tbe priest, for instance, by instrueting the countess appropriately, may exert power over the count Such mutual relations of POWER suggest to apply some notion of equilibrium to tbe net of POWER relations. Systems closer to equilibrium, so the corresponding hypothesls, arc more stable over time.
Let us finally turn to questions of explanation. 34Comparc~rao (1986) Cor a brief aocounL nation thus amounts to systematizing complex data into one comprehensive pattern or "whoIe", to see how the data fit together in some particular way. In this sense of explanatlon our theory explains sets of data whfch are available about soda] systems of the kind intended. It explains, for instance, the set cf data described before. In more realistic terms we may say that the theory provides a consistent picture or point of view from whicb a11 the actions and relations observed fit together and makesense.
The second notion of explanation is that of deductlve nomological explanation. It
Bims at explaining an etomic proposition ("a faetj by means cf deducing it from the theory plus appropriate 'initial conditions. Clearly, the latter type of explanation is just a special case of the former. Deducing an atomic sentence from initial conditions is a special case of showing that the set of both is explained as an instlUlce cf the theory. AceordinS to the deductive nomological view various explanations cf concrete behavlour can be given in thc present theory. We can explaln power relations in terms of intentions, performance and causal belief, we can explaln single actions in terms of power, we can explain Intentions and even causal bellefs In the same way. We can explain statistical differences in exertions of power amons düfer-ent groups, and so on. We may explain, for instance, why groups cf peasants obey the court's order under condidons in which ther could easily overcome him, and in which execution of the order is rather unpleasant for them. Or we may explain why the count's chlldren are educated in a way utterly different from thet of the peasants' cbildren.
In order to obtain more comprehensive, rar reaching, or criticaI explanations of social phenomena the theory elther has to be joined with other sOOal theorles 3S or to be further refined. Joining it with some form of decision theory we might obtain deeper explanations of "subordinate" behavior in terms of admissibility. The basic intuition bere is thllt possible "subordinate" actions or reactions to be evaluated in a model of decision theory in an institution are constrained by the frame of admissibillty. In the decision model relative to an institution the subordinate agent considen and evaluates only alternatives which are admissible, so her set of action alternatives is severely narrowed down in comparison to what would be feasible in the absence of the institution. On the basis of this restricted set of alternatives she chooses rationaOy, ie. 8S described by the decislon mode~but the action chosen might look quite irrational ü the institution would be left out of consideration. By further refinement, on the other band, we can achieve a real alternative to the game theoretic account of how and why institutions emerse. The basic "mechani5m" is present in the models already: Soclal institutions emerge as tbe result of new ways of exercising power which are invented and found to work suceessfully in fayour of the superordinate agents. Often, the fun final pattern of actions and reaetions develops from one single new action type whlch is invented as a new way of exerting power. Therefore it is not necessary to see the emergence of an institution 8S the introductlon in one step of a whole flnlshed pattern of action types. The pattern itself may develop in different possible ways (e.g. by trial and error) as reaetion to just one new action type. Once the resulting pattern gets stable the institution originates and grows in the interest of the groups in the "upper part" of thelr eore structure. These groups therefore are interested in having corresponding superstructures bunt up in the other indIviduaIs, and that is why institutions remain relatIve1y stable even when the conditions favourable for their emergence are gone.
